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The terms of the North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA) are examined in the light of their implications 
for, and possible impacts on, member countries of the 
Caribbean Development and Cooperation Committee (CDCC), 
most of which are also beneficiary countries under the 
Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI) of the United States of 
America. Some attention is devoted to an analysis of the 
motivations of the three NAFTA members in order to better 
inform the response which Caribbean governments might 
adopt towards this new initiative.
The implications for the CARICOM members of the CDCC 
are reviewed in the light of attempts to deepen their 
integration movement and to agree upon Common External 
Tariff (CET) levels. Their commitments to other trade and 
investment arrangements under the Lomé Convention and 
CARIBCAN are taken into account. The interests of non- 
CARICOM members of the CDCC also receive attention.
Possible CDCC responses to NAFTA are discussed 
against the backdrop of global trends towards 
liberalization and regionalism in trade and investment 
arrangements. The alternatives presented for the small 
economies of the Caribbean are circumscribed by the need 
to restructure production processes in order to take 
advantage of hemispheric trends, and the need for 
sufficient time and support to achieve this objective.
It is suggested that there might be a role for the 
CDCC in helping to inform the adjustment process in the 
Caribbean, and to inform the Caribbean's response to 
NAFTA.
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THE CARIBBEAN AND THE 
NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT (NAFTA)
BACKGROUND
The prevailing trading arrangements between Caribbean 
countries and the countries of North America, under the Caribbean 
Basin Initiative (CBI) and the Canada/CARICOM Trade and Economic 
Cooperation Agreement (CARIBCAN), are likely to be affected by new 
hemispheric developments such as the North American Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA) and the Enterprise for the Americas Initiative. 
(EAI).
The notion of a NAFTA between the United States, Mexico and 
Canada, preceded President Bush's EAI which was announced in June
1991. The EAI encompasses trade, investment and debt relief 
measures for the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean. 
Although the debt relief measures have been widely publicized, it 
is the trade aspect of the EAI that has been earmarked by the Bush 
Administration for priority attention and action. Indeed, the 
United States Trade Representative (USTR) has made it clear that 
NAFTA should be viewed as a guide-post in the journey to establish 
a hemispheric Free Trade Area (FTA), the long-term objective of the 
EAI.1
NAFTA is perceived by the Americans as the basic agreement, 
which will provide for the subsequent accession of other interested 
and eligible countries within the hemisphere. As a preliminary 
step towards the EAI, the United States has entered into framework 
agreements with most of the countries of Central and South America 
and the Caribbean. The CARICOM members of the Caribbean 
Development and Cooperation Committee (CDCC) have entered into a 
joint framework agreement with the United States which provides for 
the establishment of a United States/CARICOM Joint Council, and for 
continuing dialogue on trade and investment matters.
In the cases of Canada and Mexico these framework agreements 
were precursors to full FTA negotiations. The United States and 
Canada signed an early version of a "framework agreement" in 1988. 
It took four years from the negotiation of a framework agreement 
between the United States and Mexico before talks commenced towards 
a free trade agreement between the two countries. However, the 
United States Administration has made clear that the negotiation of 
a trade and investment framework agreement with a country or group
1 Trade, The Americas and the World: Address by Ambassador
Carla A. Hills, United States Trade Representative before the 
Organization of American States (OAS) Conference of Trade 
Ministers, Washington D.C., 29 October 1991.
of countries does not imply that the United States will be 
proposing free trade negotiations with such countries immediately. 
We are also told that future free trade programmes will be designed 
to facilitate the eventual combination of bilateral and 
plurilateral FTAs to create a larger, hemispheric barrier-free 
market.
The conclusion of the NAFTA negotiations has led to some 
uncertainty and concern in the Caribbean subregion, particularly 
regarding the Caribbean's existing trade preferences under the CBI, 
CARIBCAN, and the Lomé Convention and the subregion's competitive 
position vis-â-vis Mexico in the market of the United States. It 
has also led to discussion regarding the internal economic 
integration arrangements of the Caribbean Common Market.
'*
NAFTA in brief
The first step towards the creation of a North American Free 
Trade Area was initiated with the signing towards the end of 1987, 
of the Canada/United States Free Trade Agreement (CUSTA). The 
agreement took effect in January 1989, and called for the gradual 
elimination of all tariffs on their bilateral trade within 10 
years. CUSTA is not restricted to trade issues, and is perceived 
by both countries as a means of regulating and formalizing the 
close economic ties between them. The agreement covers a wide 
range of areas, such as the opening up of more government contracts 
to competitive bidding, establishing a legal framework for both 
commercial operations and the resolution of government disputes, 
and making investment restrictions more transparent.
The essential difference between NAFTA and the CBI for 
purposes of the member countries of the CDCC is that, whereas the 
CBI provides for non-reciprocal duty-free access for the most of 
the products of CBI-eligible countries to the United States market, 
NAFTA assumes full reciprocity. Of those products which are 
exempted from CBI tariff treatment, sugar is under quota, and 
garments are subject to preferential access arrangements. Under 
these arrangements (TSUS item 807A) the CBI-beneficiary countries 
are allowed to increase their levels of exports to the United 
States significantly faster than non-CBI members2.
The United States/Mexico negotiations were initiated by the 
Mexicans in June 1990. They were expanded to include Canada in 
February 1991. In August 1992, there was a formal announcement of 
the conclusion of negotiations for NAFTA, which seeks broad
¿ The countries that have entered into a bilateral textile 
agreement under the programme include Costa Rica, the Dominican 
Republic, Haiti, Jamaica, and Trinidad and Tobago.
■>
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agreement to eliminate restrictions on the flow of goods, services 
and investments among the three countries. Specific goals of the 
FTA are:
(a) Reduction of tariffs to zero over a period of years which 
could reach 20, (the period is 10 years in the United States/Canada 
FTA) ;
(b) Elimination of barriers to investment and ensuring an 
open investment climate;
(c) Specific attention to environmental concerns. NAFTA is 
significant in that it marks the first time in the history of 
United States trade policy that environmental concerns have been 
directly addressed in a comprehensive trade agreement; and
(d) Full protection of intellectual property rights (patents, 
copyrights and trademarks).
Immediate action agendas include these items as priority areas 
for discussion and negotiation among trade representatives of the 
three countries, as a means of preparing the stage for an eventual 
full FTA.
A North American FTA, ranging from the "Yukon to the Yucatan", 
would constitute the world's largest market with an annual 
production of more than $6 trillion and with a population of 
approximately 370 million. Canada and Mexico are respectively the 
first and third largest trading partners of the United States, and 
both countries already depend heavily on the United States market, 
which takes 70 per cent and 63 per cent, respectively, of Canadian 
and Mexican exports. The United States is much less dependent on 
the Canadian and Mexican markets. United States exports to Canada 
represent only 22 per cent of all exports and exports to Mexico 
represent only 7 per cent of American exports. Trade between 
Mexico and Canada is quite small, both absolutely and relative to 
the total exports of each country. The value of United States 
trade with Mexico and Canada in 1990 amounted to $58.6 billion and 
$175.3 billion, respectively. Canada/Mexico trade amounted to only 
$2.2 billion in 1990.
The United States Administration sees the FTA as leading to 
expanded trade with Mexico, with the potential for creating high- 
paying jobs for United States workers, especially since it would 
give United States producers (exporters) unrestricted access to a 
Mexican market of 86 million people, which may reach 100 million by 
the year 2000. Mexico already purchases more than two-thirds of 
its imports from the United States. In the area of investment, 
Mexico is already of great importance to the United States, as the 
United States accounts for 65 per cent ($25 billion) of foreign 
direct investment in Mexico.
4
Rationale for NAFTA: The American perspective
Recent economic developments in the United States are well 
known. The economic situation in that country has been 
characterized by large budgetary and trade deficits, and rising 
external debt. The budgetary deficit in 1991 was $280.6 billion, 
the current account deficit $8.66 billion and the trade deficit 
$73.6 billion. Total debt was $2851.6 billion and external debt 
$457.7 billion. Despite the fact that the United States is the 
world's largest exporter, it is now heavily dependent on inflows of 
foreign capital from the rest of the world. At the same time, it 
has been losing its technological advantage to other industrialized 
competitors, in some highly visible sectors such as automobiles and 
electronic goods. All of this is taking place in a new global 
context at the end of the cold war and the dismantling of the 
Eastern Bloc, such that politico-ideological and military 
competition among the major powers is being rapidly replaced by 
increased economic competition.
These global rearrangements may appear to point to the 
eventual emergence of a European super-bloc, in much the same way 
as it is probable that Japan and the dynamic economies of East Asia 
will configure a closer economic partnership among themselves. Add 
to these scenarios, two important considerations. First, progress 
in the Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations under the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) has been painfully 
slow, and failure of these negotiations can have significant 
negative consequences for world trade, and for United States trade. 
Secondly, the economic downturn in Latin America and the Caribbean 
has had a negative impact on the United States economy, 
particularly as a result of the dramatic reduction of the region's 
imports from the United States. Estimates by the Inter-American 
Development Bank (IDB) put Latin America and the Caribbean's loss 
of purchasing power during the 1980s at US$500 billion. Estimates 
of the consequential reduction in United States' exports to the 
region in the 1980s range between US$50 billion and $130 billion. 
This may have caused a loss of more than a million jobs in the 
United States3. These statistics underline the extent of the 
interdependence between the United States and the Latin American 
and Caribbean region.
Given this situation and in the light of developments in other 
parts of the world, the United States may have found itself induced 
to seek a consolidation of trade and investment arrangements within 
the hemisphere. A trade and investment grouping embracing the 
countries of North, Central and South America and the Caribbean, 
via the EAI, with NAFTA as its core, would constitute an important 
hemispheric market of over 700 million people.
3 SELA. SP/CL/XVI.O/DT No. 19. XVI Regular Meeting of the 
Latin American Council - 3-7 September 1990.
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The Canadian perspective
The Canadian decision to participate in the NAFTA negotiations 
was motivated primarily by its desire to avoid a dilution of its 
preferences in the United States market under CUSTA, and to a 
lesser extent, by its interest in gaining the same access to the 
Mexican market as the United States would enjoy. Canada seems to 
be particularly concerned to safeguard its position under CUSTA in 
the automobile and energy sectors, and to ensure that provisions 
exempting Canadian cultural industries from trade reforms remain 
intact.
Canada has had a long-standing trade and economic cooperation 
relationship with a number of the countries of the subregion. The 
CARIBCAN agreement cements Canada's traditional links with these 
countries by granting duty-free access to its market for a wide 
range of products. The"Canadians recognize that Caribbean goods 
will face additional'"competition under NAFTA, and have urged the 
Caribbean countries to make wise use of the transition period 
before -the NAFTA becomes operational: ■"There i s a  10 to 15-year
phase-in period for tariff reductions which is a lot of time to 
adjust, provided those years are used creatively and not just to 
postpone the inevitable4".
The Mexican perspective
NAFTA formalizes an already close economic relationship 
between the United States and Mexico. The United States is 
Mexico's largest creditor, investor and trading partner. Almost 80 
per cent of Mexico's non-oil exports are sold to the United States, 
with a considerable share of these produced by Mexican subsidiaries 
for their United States multinational parent companies, to be 
incorporated into products assembled in the United States5. The 
challenge was to find a cooperative framework which would allow the 
two countries to move beyond the constraints of their past 
relationship towards a mutually beneficial trade and investment 
association. In light of the existing Canada/United States Free 
Trade Agreement, this meant developing a trilateral free trade area 
linking these two countries with Mexico.
4 Her Excellency Jennifer McQueen, Canadian High 
Commissioner to Jamaica at a seminar "Implications and 
Opportunities of NAFTA," 21 August 1992 in Kingston. Report 
carried in the Daily Gleaner of 23 August 1992.
5 Alan Stoga "Beyond Co-existence: The United States and 
Mexico". Mexico Monograph Series - Strategic Sectors in Mexican - 
United States Free Trade.
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In the 1980s; a concerted effort was made to reorient the 
Mexican economy towards international competition and a more 
liberalized trade regime. At the start of the 1980s virtually all 
imports were subject to non-tariff barriers. Today less than 20 
per cent of imports are covered by Quantitative Restrictions (QRs). 
Tariffs were also reduced significantly. More than half of all 
imports now enter the country duty-free, and the average tariff is 
under 10 per cent. The decision to become a signatory to the GATT 
was an important indication of the intended permanence of the new 
policy orientation; and the signing of NAFTA, a formal 
acknowledgement of the reality of heavy dependence on the United
States economy for Mexican growth.
Foreign investment is perceived by both the Mexicans and the 
Americans as "the oxygen of Mexico's economic strategy". Many view 
the proposed free trade agreement as intended primarily to 
stimulate foreign investment in Mexico. New investment guidelines 
introduced in 1989, have imbued Mexican investment regulations with 
greater transparency and predictability and created a more 
welcoming investment climate. Between 1986 and 1991, United States 
business contacts in Mexico increased considerably and the United 
States was able to increase its exports to Mexico from $12.4 
billion to $33.3 billion, and reduce its trade deficit with Mexico 
from $4.9 billion to $1.8 billion. The United States has been able 
to increase its exports to Mexico twice as fast as to the rest of 
the world. The two countries recognize that a FTA is mutually 
advantageous to their countries in both trade and investment.
NAFTA is yet to be ratified by the governments of the three 
countries. With the advent of a new administration in the United 
States in January 1993, it is possible that modifications may be 
made to the text and scope of the agreement, and to the timing of 
its implementation. It appears likely that the new United States
Administration will proceed with NAFTA, even if in a modified form.
POSSIBLE IMPLICATIONS OF NAFTA FOR CARIBBEAN COUNTRIES
General observations
NAFTA has been greeted with concern by elements in both the 
public and private sectors of Caribbean countries. Adding to 
Caribbean disquiet is the message that "the Administration does not 
support including unilateral preferences for third world countries 
in the NAFTA agreement"6. This may be interpreted to mean that CBI 
preferences will not be accommodated under NAFTA. In any event, 
the United States Administration may not consider Caribbean
6 White House Document, "NAFTA and the Caribbean Basin 
Initiative (CBI) countries", 7 August 1992.
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countries to be ready for NAFTA. The Assistant United States Trade 
Representative for Latin America, the Caribbean and Africa said 
recently: "In our view, no country other than Chile, is now ready
to begin free trade negotiations with the United States"7. He 
stressed that Congress would have to be convinced that trade 
negotiations maximized United States benefits: "The assessment of 
the prospective benefits would take into account a variety of 
factors; the size of the market would be a consideration." 
Caribbean pressure to obtain from NAFTA the same access to United 
States markets as Mexico without reciprocity was dismissed as 
"unrealistic".
The structure of trade.in the Caribbean subregion suggests 
that the impact of NAFTA on the Caribbean could be substantial. 
Approximately 50 per cent to 70 per cent of all exports from the 
region go to the three NAFTA countries. In the case of Jamaica, 
for example, approximately 60 per cent of the export trade is 
transacted with the United States, Canada and Mexico8. There is 
concern in the region that NAFTA could result in trade and 
investment diversion from the Caribbean countries to Mexico.
NAFTA could put CBI countries at a competitive disadvantage in 
the United States market as it stipulates the removal of tariff and 
quota protection on certain goods which Caribbean countries 
currently export to the United States on favourable access terms. 
Mexico, which already has cheap labour and energy, lower 
transportation costs and considerable potential for economies of 
scale, would be provided under NAFTA with an enhanced opportunity 
of attracting investment from North America. It is not 
inconceivable that among those investors would be some who are 
attracted by Mexico’s supposed lower environmental standards; or 
some who might have been interested in the Caribbean as an offshore 
investment location. The United States International Trade 
Commission's (ITC) report entitled, "Potential effects of a North
7 Myles Freshette, Assistant USTR to the West Indian 
Commission and the Caribbean American Press, Washington D.C. 
Statement carried in the Daily Gleaner, 15 September 1992.
8 "The Implications of the NAFTA for Jamaica and the CBI 
Region: A Policy Proposal" - statement by H.E. Richard Bernal, 
Jamaican Ambassador to the United States. Statement before the 




American Free Trade Agreement on apparel investments in (CBI) 
countries" concludes: "A NAFTA will introduce incentives that will 
tend to favour apparel investment shifts away from the (CBI) 
countries to Mexico"9.
There may be a real danger of closure or contraction of 
Caribbean industries such as apparel and rum, which are very 
important to a number of Caribbean economies, and which have been 
dependent on favourable access conditions in the United States 
market.
NAFTA. CBI. CARIBCAN and Caribbean countries
In one important respect, the interests of the majority of 
CDCC countries are quite distinct from those of other developing 
countries. Most of the exports of CDCC member countries fall under 
special preferential trading arrangements under the CBI, CARIBCAN 
and the Lomé Convention.
In respect of the products for which the 24 countries eligible 
under CBI enjoy duty-free access, Mexico would be brought on to the 
same footing. For the CARICOM members of the CDCC, the same 
situation holds for CARIBCAN10. Mexico's added attractiveness from 
the trade and investment perspectives would be with respect to the 
products, currently.excluded from CBI and CARIBCAN, or which face 
non-tariffsbarriers (NTBs). The United States is already a low 
tariff country, and the advantages that the NAFTA partners may 
enjoy would derive in part from the elimination of non-tariff 
barriers. NAFTA could adversely affect CBÏ and CARIBCAN countries 
by reducing the margin of preference which these countries 
currently enjoy in relation to Mexico.
Implementation of NAFTA would increase the relative advantage 
of Mexico over the CBI countries in several ways:
(a) As long as Mexico can export to the United States market 
duty-free, the same products as the CBI beneficiary countries, the 
CBI advantage would be lost;
(b) Most non-sensitive products from both Mexico and the CBI 
countries now enter the United States duty-free under the 
Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) whether or not they are 
eligible under the CBI. Although there is no advantage either way,
9 United States International Trade Commission: "Potential 
Effects of a North American Free Trade Agreement on Apparel 
Investments in CBERA countries."
10 CARICOM. Preliminary Note on CARICOM's Strategy towards 
NAFTA: HGC 92/13/4.
9
NAFTA would give Mexico the advantage in that its duty-free access 
would be made permanent through a trilaterally negotiated 
contractual agreement offering secure trade and investment 
opportunities; as opposed to the CBI which is a non-reciprocal, 
unilateral arrangement. Investors may prefer a binding treaty to 
the conferral of a privilege, on which to form the basis of an 
investment decision;
(c) CARIBCAN has also been legislated by Canada without any 
specified duration. The Canadians confirmed during the last 
meeting of the Joint Trade and Economic Commission (JTEC), that 
CARIBCAN's preference to CARICOM members of the CDCC was of 
indefinite duration. However, as with the CBI, investors may 
prefer to base investment decisions on a binding treaty;
(d) Products which remain dutiable under the CBI, principally 
apparel, footwear and some leather goods, are expected tp be 
granted gradually phased-in duty reductions under NAFTA. This 
would provide Mexico with an added advantage in the attraction of 
investment, an advantage which would increase over time. The 
combined effect of more favourable duty treatment for Mexican 
exports and eroding quota advantages for CBI exports, could cause 
the CBI countries to experience disinvestment in the critical 
apparel sector. This would be a major blow for them since many CBI 
countries, relying in part on quota exemptions, have enjoyed great 
success in attracting firms in these industries, despite their non­
duty-free status in the American market; and these firms have 
contributed significantly to employment generation, particularly 
among women.
Impact of NAFTA on selected sectors of Caribbean economies
NAFTA could potentially have implications for the agriculture 
and manufacturing sectors of member countries of the CDCC, as well 
as for the services sectors.
The exports of the Caribbean are primarily agricultural or 
agriculture-based and minerals, such as bauxite, alumina or 
petroleum (see Table I). Traditional agricultural exports, such as 
sugar and bananas, and agriculture-based commodities such as rum 
are among the principal foreign exchange earners. Efforts to 
improve the manufacturing base have been successful only in terms 
of the establishment of low value-added, light manufacturing for 
the regional market under high tariff walls, and that taking place 
in export processing zones or under similar conditions. For the 
majority of CDCC countries, the United States and Canada are their 
largest export markets. Notable exceptions to this are the four 
Windward Islands of Dominica, Grenada, Saint Lucia and Saint 
Vincent and the Grenadines, which depend on preferential market 
conditions in Europe for the export of their bananas; and Cuba for 
which country Eastern Europe was the dominant export destination 
throughout the 1980s (see Table II).
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Bahamas 19ÔÕ 5009.4 0.4 0.1 96.8 0.2 2.5 ^. 0 0.4 "0\1
1985 2728.4 1.4 0.1 88.4 0.5 9.6 8.7 0.3 0.6
1986 2702.0 1.4 0.1 85.2 0.7 12.7 10.4 0.6 1 .6
1987 2544.5 2.2 0.1 85.1 0.6 11.3 10.4 0.4 0.6 Ó ! 7
Barbados 1980 149.5 47.0 0.1 0.2 0.2 52.5 7.1 29.9 15.5
1985 214.9 15.7 0.2 • • • 0.1 83.8 1.2 11.9 70.7 Ò . 2
1986 209.1 18.9 0.1 0.5 80.3 4.5 16.7 59.1 0.2
1987 156.0 26.9 0.8 18.6 0.4 52.1 10.6 20.0 21 .5 1.2
1988 176.1 26.9 0.7 16.0 0.5 53.4 11.9 23.5 18.1 2.6
Belize 1980 82.5 79.4 2.8 17.6 0.4 17.2 0.1
1985 64.4 73.9 1.2 24 .9 0.7 24 .2
1986 74.0 79.9 1.6 18.5 0.1 18.4
1987 99.4 69.3 12.3 • • . 17.7 0.4 17.2 0.1 0 . 7
1988 119.7 76.9 3.6 ... 0.2 18.0 0.6 16.6 0.8 1.3
Cuba 1980 5540.8 89.3 0.3 4.6 0.3 0.3 5.4
1985 6484.5 82.3 0.1 1ÓÍ4 5.6 1.7 Ò . 3 1.0 ÒÍ4
1986 6298.0 84.3 0.1 8.6 5.4 1.6 0.3 0.9 0.4
1987 5401.0 82.4 0.1 9.9 5.9 1.6 0.3 1.0 0.3 , • • •
Dominica 1980 9.3 45.6 0.1 54.3 53.1 1 .2
1985 28.4 59.9 0.4 39.8 28.5 6.3 4 ! 9
1988 56.0 68.7 0.6 29.9 16.9 5.1 7.9 Ó . 5
1989 43.6 65.8 0.7 33.5 27.7 5.7 0.1
Dorn.Rep. 1980 703.9 73.2 0.2 3.1 23.6 5.9 17.0 Q.7
1985 738.5 42.7 0.5 1.1 42.2 1 .2 38.7 2.3 13.6

















1987 31.5 83.5 0*3 . • • 16.2 • . . 12.1 4.'i
1988 27.9 73.5 0.4 0.4 25.4 1 .4 18.6 5.4 Ó. 4
Guyana 1980 388.9 47.6 2.2 38.0 11.0 8.2 1.8 1.0 1.2
1986 218.0 59.1 4.6 21.0 12.8 5.2 4.0 3.5 2.6
Haiti 1985 174.0 19.2 1.1 1.0 74.2 1.6 53.6 19.0 4.5
1986 170.0 20.9 1.1 1.2 72.8 1 .7 54.2 16.9 4.1
Jamaica 1980 942.4 13.7 0.3 1.9 21.4 62.7 58.6 3.4 0.6
1985 535.1 26.1 0.4 5.2 15.0 53.2 42.8 9.9 0.5
1986 567.2 28.0 0.6 3.1 16.4 51.9 39.0 12.5 0.4
1987 692.3 26.6 0.7 2.0 16.6 54.1 35.4 18.2 0.4 ...
1988 811 .6 25.4 0.5 2.3 13.4 58.4 41 .0 16.8 0.6
Neth. Ant. 1980 5157.6 0.1 98.4 0.1 1.3 1 .1 0.1 0.1 ...
1985 1667.0 0.2 0.1 97.2 0.5 1.8 1.0 0.4 0.4
1986 839.0 0.4 0.2 96.8 0.2 2.5 1.4 0.7 0.4
St Kitts 1985 24 .0 23.3 17.5 0.8 49.2 1 .7 32.9 14.6 9.2
1986 31.0 29.4 4.5 0.6 57.7 3.2 37.1 17.4 7.7
1987 31 .1 42.8 Ò.3 5.1 0.6 46.6 1.0 32.8 12.9 4.5
St Lucia 1980 33.7 57.0 0.7 42.3 1 .2 27.6 13.5
1985 53.0 67.5 0.6 ... • . 31.7 1.5 19.2 10.9 Ó . 2
1986 83.0 74.3 0.7 24.8 1.1 15.0 8.7 0.2
St Vincent 1980 15.7 84.2 0.2 14.1 0.3 9.4 4.4 ...
1985 34.0 95.0 . , , i Í6 5.0 0.6 3.8 0.6
1986 39.0 93.8 • , 6.2 0.8 4.6 0.8
1987 39.3 87.5 CL3 12.2 1 .8 6.4 4.1
Trinidad/ 1980 4077.0 2.1 93.7 0.1 4.1 2.7 0.9 0.5 0.1
Tobago 1985 2160.9 2.1 * • 79.1 0.3 18.2 12.8 2.5 2.9 0.2
1987 1462.4 4.5 • • • 71.2 0.7 23.4 14.1 7.9 1.4 0.2
1988 1412.0 6.0 60.5 0.6 32.7 20.9 10.4 1 .3 0.2
1989 1578.1 6.0 61.0 0.7 31.5 18.3 11.9 1.3 0.2



















Japan Othara Total OPEC Aaarlca Africa W.Asia 8&SE
Aaia
Bahaaaa 19B0 50010.0 89.0 21.0 17.0 67.0 0.3 0.1 l .0 0.3 9.0 0.2 0 3 0.71985 2728.0 97.2 6.0 6.0 89.0 2.0 0.4 3.0 0.3 1.4 1.2 0.1
199? 2644.0 96. 1 4.0 4.0 90.0 2.6 0.2 4.0 2.6 0.9 0.1
Barbado* 1990 149.6 67.7 20.8 20.3 46.9 0.1 32.0 0.4 31.0 1.0
1986 214.9 96.9 10.9 10.6 84.0 o!i 0.1 3.8 3.6 0.21988 170. 1 61.2 22.1 21.7 20.2 0.7 0.1 31.2 31 .2 0 . 1
Baliza 1980 92.6 92.2 30.9 30.8 61.0 0.3 7.8 7.7 0.21996 64.4 93.6 30.0 28.6 63.4 0.1 6.5 ó!¿ 6.41998 119.7 87.6 42.9 42.9 43.9 0.6 12.6 12.4 o’i
Cuba 1980 5640.8 11.9 6.2 4.3 2.9 2.8 69 6 3.0 8.3 6.1 4.2 3 8 0.31985 6484.5 9.3 0.4 3.1 0.6 .3 86 2.9 2.0 0.8 1.3 0 6 0.31987 6401.0 8.6 6.5 6.2 0.7 1.4 86 8 2.0 2.6 0.6 1 .1 0.7 0 4 0.2
Do«inlet 1980 9.3 36.8 36.2 36.8 0.6 63.2 63.21986 28.4 66.0 60.7 60.7 6.3 44.0 44.01088 66.0 73.3 68.6 68.6 4.8 26.7 26.71980 43.6 66.9 59.2 69.2 7.7 31 .9 31.9
Ooa Hap 1980 703.9 79.9 14.9 11.5 63.9 1.2 0 6 19.6 13.0 16.0 3.61986 738.6 96.7 16.6 11 .0 70.3 1 .9 0 4 3.9 0.3 3.7 0.1 Ô. i1987 718.0 96.9 11.0 11 .0 B3.7 1.1 0 4 3.7 0.3 3.6 0.1
Oranada 1990 16.9 94.9 78.6 77.2 6.4 1 0 13.9 13.8 01086 21.8 61.1 66.9 65.7 6.0 Ó!l 1 6 37.1 36.9 01989 27.9 78.5 66.3 04.2 12.2 21 .1 21 .1
Guyana 1980 388.9 73.2 41.5 37.7 27.7 3.4 0.6 1 3 25.2 6.1 24.4 0.5 0.2
1980 219.0 41.6 22.8 20.4 14.4 4.2 0.7 1 7 54.9 7.1 52.5 1.7
Haiti 1986 174.0 96.3 13.4 13.9 91.2 0.5 0.1 4.7 0.2 4.0 0.2 0 61986 ’ 170.0 95.5 17.7 16.4 77.2 0.5 0.1 4.5 0.2 4.0 0.2 0 4
Jaaaica 1980 942.4 79.6 38.7 20.6 40.2 0.6 0.1 6 3 15.1 2.2 9.6 4.6 0 8 0.71995 635.1 78.1 24. 1 21.0 62.6 1.4 0.1 5 6 15.0 11.7 3.31988 8M.6 86.1 33.6 30.6 61.1 1.1 0.3 4 0 9.6 Ó ’, i 8.9 0.5 ó :¡
Nath Ant 1980 6167.6 66.4 13.0 11.6 62.2 0.6 0.6 32.9 4.4 26.2 4.7 0.91986 1667.0 60.1 12.0 11.3 46.9 0.2 1.0 39.7 2.0 35.7 3.5 0.41980 839.0 46.9 11 .0 109 34.4 1.3 0.3 52.8 2.4 48.2 4.3 0.2
St Kitt* 1986 24.0 76.0 6.0 6.0 70.0 26.0 26.0
1997 31.t 76.2 20.9 20.9 64.3 24.6 24.4 old
St. Lucia 1990 33.7 67.7 33.6 33.6 24.1 ... 42.3 0.4 42.2 0.11996 63.0 40.1 49. 1 40.1 60.9 0.4 60.8 0.2
1980 63.0 60.0 60.0 60.0 40.0 0.4 40.0
Bt Vineant I960 16.7 66.6 60.6 60.6 4.9 44.6 44.61986 34.0 68.8 68.9 69.6 31.2 31.21987 39.3 71.2 71 .2 71.0 27.2 22. 1 i '. 't
Surin*»* 1980 614.0 80.8 14.9 14.6
1996 328.8 78.3 21.6 19.9
1980 329.3 62.0 17.4 17.4
Trinidad/ 1980 4077.0 73.5 12.6 11.7 60.6 0.1 21 .8 0.2 19.1 2.2 0 5
Tobago 1988 1386.7 82.2 16.2 14.8 66.9 1.1 ¿!i 16.6 0.6 16.0 0 0 .5
1999 1678.1 07.8 9.6 9.1 67.0 0.7 0.4 29.1 2.2 27.4 ÓÍ7 0 2 0.9
Sourca: UNCTAD Handbook of Int«rn«tional Trad* and Davalopaant Statistic*, 1990.IMP Direction of Trad* Statistics Yearbook; variou* «ditions and 
UNCTAD Handbook of International Trad* and Davalopnant 8tati*tics 1990.
The major CDCC exports to Canada and the United States are rum 
and alcoholic beverages, textile and apparel products, agricultural 
produce such as bananas, mangoes, pineapples, coffee, cocoa, 
tropical woods, rice, tobacco, coconut, spices and cut flowers; 
sugar, mineral and manufactured commodities like aluminium and 
electronics software. It is feared that NAFTA may have the effect 
of undermining the competitive position of these commodities in the 
United States market.
In the case of rum and alcoholic beverages, Mexico's large 
capacity poses a threat to the large rum producers of the 
Caribbean, such as Jamaica> Puerto Rico and the United States 
Virgin Islands, depending on whether or not special access
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i? arrangements for these products are agreed. Successful rum 
I production requires large amounts of molasses and petroleum. In 
< Mexico, these resources are readily available, whereas in the 
Caribbean, these two major inputs are imported. As a result, the 
rum industry in the Caribbean could be at a significant competitive 
disadvantage compared with Mexico, if rum were accorded duty-free 
treatment under NAFTA.
CARICOM rums have duty-free access to the Canadian market, but 
are subject to bottling and blending requirements, and to marketing 
arrangements stipulated by the Provincial Liquor Boards in Canada. 
Under CUSTA these restrictions do not apply to United States 
exports to Canada. If under NAFTA the Canada/United States free 
trade provisions were to be extended to Mexico, the Caribbean's rum 
competitiveness would be diminished. They are likely to be unable 
to compete with Mexico which has vast rum producing capacity; (as 
far back as 1981, it was producing 136 million litres, in 
comparison with a major Caribbean rum producer, Jamaica, which has 
a current capacity of 26 million litres of absolute alcohol). The 
elimination of tariffs and the removal of marketing, bottling and 
blending restrictions would enhance the competitiveness of Mexican 
rums. It is to be hoped that, over time, Caribbean rum producers 
will be able to take advantage of their long-standing tradition of 
rum manufacture to secure a continued place in the markets of the 
United States and Canada.
Non-tariff barriers such as quotas and user fees will cease to 
apply to Mexican exports over a maximum period of 10 years. Some 
of these barriers will still apply to important exports from CBI 
States, such as textiles and apparel products, sugar, citrus and 
* agricultural products . Assistance will be granted to Mexico to 
enable it to achieve United States standards, which will put Mexico 
in a more favourable position to overcome these NTBs. This may 
operate to the disadvantage of Caribbean countries such as 
Barbados, Belize, Dominican Republic, Haiti and Jamaica which have 
benefited from special access arrangements for most of these 
products, in particular, garments.
Textile exporters and garment manufacturers, particularly from 
Asia, have taken advantage of these special access arrangements by 
investing in garment manufacturing in CBI-beneficiary countries. 
Expansion of the garment industry has generated significant levels 
of employment, particularly for females. The probability that the 
Mexican maquiladoras, (factories operating in export processing 
zones), may gain at the expense of the Caribbean garment 
industries, can have troubling negative short to medium-term 
consequences for employment and investment in a number of Caribbean 
countries. Mexican garment exports which do not satisfy United 
States rules of origin will face duties, and will also be subject 
to quantitative restrictions. CBI goods would be rendered
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relatively less competitive due to the continuing imposition of 
.duties on them; and their growth potential would be limited because 
of the elimination of quotas on Mexican exports, which quotas were 
in existence prior to NAFTA.
NAFTA rules of origin allow the use of inputs from non-NAFTA 
countries into NAFTA products. Bearing in mind the CBI and 
CARIBCAN stipulations in this area, this may well have implications 
for the movement of CBI and CARIBCAN exports across the NAFTA 
countries. Would it be possible, for example, for a product with 
United States components from a CBI State to be re-exported to 
Canada, duty-free? These are among questions to which definite 
answers may not yet be available.
Agricultural products from Mexico are produced on a much 
larger scale than is possible in most of the CDCC member countries. 
In 1990, Mexico exported to Canada alone C$104 million worth of 
these products as against C$4.8 million of duty-free produce from 
CARICOM members of the CDCC. Mexico, is the second largest 
supplier of agricultural produce to the United States. Forty per 
cent of agricultural exports to the United States already enter 
duty-free, and the remainder of products are dutiable at a weighted 
average of 7 per cent ad valorem. Mexican farmers can supply the 
United States market with products similar to those grown in CDCC 
countries at a lower cost than produce, such as winter vegetables, 
grown in the United States itself. When accorded duty-free access 
under NAFTA, given the larger availability of arable land, and 
access to low-cost domestically produced fertilizers, pesticides 
and other agricultural inputs, a massive increase in agricultural 
exports to the United States and Canada can be anticipated.
According to the United States International Trade Commission 
(ITC), NAFTA would "affect significantly the level of US trade with 
Mexico in agricultural products." It could increase United States 
imports of citrus fruit and winter vegetable from Mexico 
considerably, agricultural commodities which are now exported to 
the United States market from Caribbean countries. Mexican exports 
to the United States in these commodities have already doubled 
during the 1980s.
Agricultural products from Mexico, which are deemed to be 
sensitive, will enjoy improved access to the United States market, 
as tariffs or quotas may be applied in Mexico's favour. Exports 
from third countries which exceed these quotas will be dutiable. 
This may place some agricultural exports from CDCC countries at a 
disadvantage. In the case of sugar, the United States has made 
allowance for the full liberalization of Mexican exports. This 
will favour Mexico's large sugar production potential and 
simultaneously reduce quotas on Caribbean Basin sugar exports to 
the United States. NAFTA countries will be permitted to impose 
subsidies in cases where they deem that injury has been caused by 
third country imports. On this basis, they will be able to set
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subsidy levels compatible with effective levels of competition for 
their NAFTA products to the detriment of sugar exporters such as 
Barbados, Belize, Dominican Republic, Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, Saint 
Kitts and Nevis and Trinidad and Tobago.
Regarding the minerals sector, Canada has indicated that 
NAFTA will facilitate economic complementation whereby Mexico's 
considerable pool of mineral resources will be developed and 
refined using Canadian expertise. It is unclear at this stage how 
this potentially beneficial linkage among the NAFTA partners will 
affect investments in, and exports of, bauxite, alumina and 
aluminium from the Dominican Republic, Guyana, Jamaica and 
Suriname.
In the area of services, NAFTA will remove investment 
restrictions, and protect intellectual property rights as between 
its members. The United States high technology and entertainment 
producers could realize substantial gains for their patents, 
copyrights and trademarks under NAFTA which will favour Mexico over 
CDCC countries in investment in these sectors. In addition to 
attractive provisions for investment in Mexico, United States and 
Canadian companies may enjoy full ownership in Mexican enterprises. 
Improved access to the Mexican telecommunications sector (including 
data processing) under NAFTA by the United States and Canada will 
increase trade contacts and create greater efficiency than exists 
at present. There could possibly be an increase in United States 
and Canadian tourist visitors to Mexico, as a spinoff from a closer- 
trade and economic relationship among the three countries, and also 
possibly some diversion of tourist traffic from the Caribbean to 
Mexico.
Many CDCC countries have investment restrictions in their 
telecommunications sectors, thereby limiting foreign investments 
which might otherwise assist in enhancing technological efficiency. 
Three member countries of the CDCC, Cuba, Jamaica and Trinidad and 
Tobago are parties to the Framework for Trade in Services proposed 
by SELA11. While these countries agree with most-favoured nation 
treatment for services generally, they have always resisted 
national treatment. They have consistently derogated from 
reciprocity in order to facilitate the development of their 
national services sectors. Now , that Mexico is presenting an 
irresistible invitation to investors in North America in 
telecommunications, banking, insurance and other services, CDCC 
countries are not in a position to match it, given their national 
stances on investment in this sector. If they wish to offer a 
competitive services climate, they must reconsider their approach 
to this sector, and move to open it to foreign investors.
11 Other parties to this agreement are Brazil, Chile,
Colombia, Cuba, Honduras, Nicaragua, Mexico, Peru and Uruguay.
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NAFTA provides for the establishment of an efficient land 
transportation system among the NAFTA States. This improved 
infrastructure will further project Mexico as an ideal investment 
location, 'by providing a distinct cost advantage for Mexican 
exports." The only means of transport available to CDCC countries 
are maritime and air transport facilities which are more costly 
than land transport. In addition, a United States moratorium on 
grants to truck and bus operation authorities will be amended to 
permit complete access for Mexican charter and tour bus operators 
to its cross border market. In this context, low cost tourism 
packages between the United States and Mexico could quite possibly 
increase, thus possibly diverting United States tourists away from 
Caribbean destinations.
NAFTA AND CARICOM REGIONAL ARRANGEMENTS
In their attempt to deepen the integration movement, the 
member States of the Common Market of the Caribbean Community 
agreed in July 1990 to put into effect a new CARICOM Common 
External Tariff (CET) and revised Rules of Origin for purposes of 
trade within the Common Market.
Under this CET structure, member States agreed not to exempt 
or reduce tariffs on specified commodities, the rationale being to 
create opportunity for production of, and trade in, these 
commodities within the Common Market by subjecting them to common 
regional tariff rates. This tariff structure provided for a 
significant reduction of the rate of duty to 45 per cent at the 
highest level.
The revised Rules of Origin were intended to promote the 
utilization by manufacturers in the region of material or other 
production inputs produced by regional enterprises in the 
manufacture of final goods to be traded within the Common Market. 
Other origin rules changes were aimed at increasing local and 
regional value-added in the processing operations performed by 
regional manufacturers.
In addition to regionally agreed rates, national regulations 
had the effect of increasing the protection accorded to regional 
production. A number of the CARICOM States also applied additional 
fiscal charges, which had the effect of raising the average tariff 
from 20 per cent to rates between 3 5 per cent and 53 per cent12. 
Guyana, the only exception, abolished all such additional trade 
charges. The Organization of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS)
12 World Bank. The Caribbean Common Market - Trade Policies 
and Regional Integration in the 1990s, March 1990.
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countries which base their protection on the East Caribbean Common 
Market (ECCM) tariff, adhered to it fairly closely, with only 
comparatively small additional charges, except for Grenada, which 
imposed relatively high additional trade charges. These surcharges 
were product-specific. Overall, however, it appeared that 
protection was higher for manufacturing than for agriculture.
Quite apart from levels of nominal protection which some 
commentators consider to be very high, a World Bank study has found 
effective levels of protection to be so high as to inhibit the 
development of efficient and internationally competitive industries 
in the Caribbean13. High levels of effective protection can have 
the effect of encouraging low value-added production for the 
domestic or regional market, and discouraging resource allocation 
in favour of internationally competitive production.
CARICOM's Rules of Origin, designed to deepen the 
industrialization process, were found by a (controversial) World 
Bank Study to have an inhibiting effect on trade in light 
manufactures, in which some CARICOM States may well have a 
comparative advantage, and to operate to the disadvantage of the 
industrialization processes in the countries of the Caribbean. If 
these findings are correct, CARICOM's total trade regime might have 
had the effect of encouraging inefficient industries and delaying 
the Caribbean's preparedness for competing in international 
markets.
In Mexico, on the other hand, changes in tariff levels and the 
dismantling of quantative restrictions proceeded with breath-taking 
speed during the late 1980s, with emphasis on efficiency in 
domestic production through the opening up of the economy to 
external competition.
At their conference in Port-of-Spain in October 1992, CARICOM 
Heads of Government reduced the tariff levels under the CARICOM CET 
for non-agricultural products, from 45 to 35 per cent at the 
highest levels, and agreed to work towards a reduction to 20 to 5 
per cent by 1998. Agricultural products will retain a range of 40 
to 0 per cent up to 1998 (see Table 3). The new rates, which were 
agreed after protracted bargaining, are directed at creating an 
internationally competitive industry, and reflect a recognition of 
the prerequisites to participation in the changing global economy.
Much the same can be said about the Dominican Republic where 
the New Economic Policy, initiated in 1990, has paved the way for 
fundamental changes in the tariff of that country. The Government 
has consolidated the tariff schedule, which had previously 
consisted of 140 different rates, into seven ad-valorem import 
rates, falling within a range of between 5-35 per cent. The market
13 Ibid.
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exchange rate will now be used for valuation. The new schedule 
allows for a four-year transitional period, during which the 
average nominal tariff rate will fall from 90 per cent to 20 per 
cent, if completion is achieved on schedule.
This new regime represents a significant simplification from 
one which suffered from the burden of 27 separate laws regulating 
imports. Previously there were three fixed exchange rates, applied 
to five different combinations of specific and ad-valorem taxes, 
making for 15 different ways to impose duties. The new tariff is 
expected to improve the competitiveness of industry, to streamline 
the administrative arrangements surrounding international trade, 
and make the new regulations less amenable to arbitrary 
interpretation.
T a b le  I I I  
CARICOM - COMMON EXTERNAL TARIFF RATES
CATEGORIES 1-1-93 TO 31-12-94 (1-1 -95 TO 31-12-96) 1-1-97 TO 31-12-97 1-1-98
Agricultural Inputs 0 0 0 0
Non-competing primary inputs Non-competing intermediate inputs Non-competing capital inputs
5 (LDCs 0-5) 5 (LDCs 0-5) 5 (LDCS 0-5) 5 (LDCs 0-5)
Competing primary inputs Competing capital goods Selected exports
20 15 10 10
Competing intermediate inputs 25 20 15 15
Non-competing final goods 25 25-30 20-25 20
Agro-industryGarmentsGeneral manufactures
30-35 25-30 20-25 20
Agriculture 40 40 40 40
LIST A LIST 6 LIST CLIST 0 PARTS I ANO III Safety
Suspended rates Suspended rate* LDCs Minimum rates Suspended rates LDCs 0
Suspsndsd rates Suspsndsd ratas LDCs Minimum ratss Suspended retee LDCs 0
Minimum rates Minimum rates
Cost of livingSooio-economio and socio-cultural 0-20 0-20
Range of CET íAgricultura) Range of CET (Non-agriculture) 0-405-35 0-405-30 0-405-25 0-405-20
Source: Derived from report of CARICOM Speeial Meeting of the Heads of Govsrnmsnt October 1992
CONSIDERATION OF INTERESTS OF NON-CARICOM MEMBERS OF CDCC
In the case of the non-CARICOM members of the CDCC which are 
also beneficiary countries under the CBI, NAFTA will erode the 
value of existing market preferences in the United States market. 
Like the rest of the CDCC subregion, these countries would ideally 
like to see included in the NAFTA, a mechanism for accommodating 
CBI-type trade preferences. The United States Virgin Islands has 
proposed to the Subcommittee on Trade of the Ways and Means 
Committee of the United States House of Representatives, the
)
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establishment of a transition mechanism to maintain relative 
preferences under the CBI for the longest possible period14. This 
transition mechanism would provide for an extended 20-year phase­
out of United States duties under the NAFTA on a select number of 
Caribbean products. This phase-out period should be no less than 
the phase-out period that would be accorded to the most sensitive 
products from the United States, Canada and Mexico.
The United States Virgin Islands proposed a CBI "basket" of 
sensitive products, which includes rum, in which the United States 
Virgin Islands has a very special interest. It is perceived that 
NAFTA would confer an enormous advantage on Mexican distillers, 
which would have the effect of injuring the United States Virgin 
Islands' rum industry. Puerto Rico is similarly concerned about 
the potentially damaging effect on its rum industry. On the other 
hand, the reduction of trade barriers between Mexico and the United 
States may make some Puerto Rican goods more competitive in the 
Mexican market.
In the case of the Dominican Republic, there is concern that 
NAFTA might cause injury to the garment industry which has grown 
rapidly over the past 10 years, and has been in part responsible 
for the growth of export processing zones in the country. Such 
injury would result from Mexico's improved position under NAFTA as 
a supplier of garments to the United States. Companies in the 
export processing zones of the Dominican Republic employ 140,000 
people and generate $250 million a year in foreign exchange. In the 
absence of any recent data on Haiti, it is supposed that there 
could be similar negative consequences for that country.
The interests of all members of the CDCC which are CBI 
beneficiaries are similar, in the sense of wanting to preserve, as 
far as possible, the preferential access to the United States 
market which they enjoy under the CBI; and equivalency with Mexico, 
of preferential access to the United States market for those 
products which currently do not benefit from duty-free access to 
the United States market.
NAFTA IN THE CONTEXT OF THE LOME CONVENTION
Under the Lomé IV Convention, the European Community (EC) 
accords unlimited duty-free access to most of the Caribbean's 
agricultural and industrial products, including garments. Any 
attempt to gain accession to NAFTA would immediately focus 
attention on Article 25 of the Lomé IV Convention, under which
14 Honourable Derek M. Hodge, Lt. Governor of the United 
States Virgin Islands. Statement before the Sub-committee on Trade 





Caribbean members of the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) group 
of countries would be obligated to extend most favoured nation 
(MFN) treatment to products of the European Community, similar to 
that accorded the United States and Canada. This MFN provision is 
a clause which is usually included in bilateral trade agreements, 
and the requirement to grant reciprocal duty-free access to 
Caribbean markets for the products of the European Community would 
also apply to the products of other countries, with which Caribbean 
countries may have negotiated bilateral trade agreements.
Caribbean countries, signatories to the Lomé Convention, may 
well consider that granting duty-free access to the products of the 
EC is a small price to pay in the context of a decision to seek 
accession to NAFTA —  if it is a price at all. If the Caribbean 
eventually finds itself in a position of having to agree to 
reciprocal duty-free access to the products of the United States of 
America, Canada and Europe, it may well be keen to provide a 
greater degree of choice to its consumers and producers by throwing 
the gates open to European products as well. The alternative is to 
risk termination of the Convention which, in the light of its 
acknowledged importance to the Caribbean, is not considered to be 
an issue at this time.
ELIGIBILITY CRITERIA FOR NAFTA
CBI-beneficiary countries do not automatically qualify for 
accession to NAFTA because they may have signed a framework 
agreement with the United States under the EAI, as the CARICOM 
countries have done. Official United States spokesmen have stated 
that the Caribbean countries are not considered to be eligible 
candidates for accession to NAFTA. This is clearly borne out from 
a summary of the criteria for participation in future free trade 
agreements negotiated under the EAI, provided by the United States 
delegation to a recent EAI Trade and Investment Council Meeting15. 
The following are among the elements specified:
A country seeking to enter a FTA with the United States 
should be committed to a stable, macroeconomic environment and 
market-oriented policies;
A country should be committed to the multilateral trading 
system. The EAI is considered to be compatible with, and 
supportive of, the multilateral trading system. The United States 
position states that FTAs should be fully consistent with the 
provisions of GATT article XXIV;
Attachment to CARICOM Document HGC/92/13/4.
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Prospective FTA partners must be seen to have 
demonstrated progress in achieving open trade regimes and are in 
good standing in the GATT;
FTA arrangements will be reciprocal in nature, with a 
balance of rights and obligations on both sides.
For countries to make progress in terms of FTA eligibility, 
the central requirements are:
Elimination of tariffs over an agreed phase-out period;
A corresponding phase-out of non-tariff barriers;
Provisions to permit the movement of goods and increased 
access to government procurement;
Effective market access for services on a broad scale;
Agreed rules for the application of standards and rules
of origin;
An investment provision containing the substantive 
equivalent of a "Bilateral Investment Treaty";
Obligations to recognize and protect intellectual
property rights. Agreement on intellectual property rights could 
precede an FTA negotiation;
Special provisions to deal with natural resources and 
natural resource-based products; and
FTAs should discipline specific categories of government 
actions which could undermine the basis of the agreement. These 
would include provisions covering subsidies, state trading, trade 
restraints justified on balance-of-payments grounds and the use of 
foreign exchange controls and restrictions.
These stipulations make clear why most CBI countries,
particularly CARICOM countries, would at the present time be 
considered ineligible for accession to NAFTA. For progress in the 
above outlined areas to be considered satisfactory prior to 
accession, a number of strategic and policy changes would have to 
be put in place. Some of these changes may not be compatible with
decisions already taken at the CARICOM level.
The stipulations regarding "special provisions to deal with 
natural resources and natural resource-based products" may hint at 
a requirement to concede elements of national prerogative regarding 
the exploitation of natural resources.
>
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That FTAs should "discipline" specific categories of 
government actions with regard to the imposition of subsidies, 
state trading and trade restraints, is another criterion to which 
Caribbean governments would wish to pay attention. Generally, it 
might have been useful, (within the context of NAFTA or otherwise), 
to survey the extent to which individual member countries of the 
CDCC match to each of the criteria listed above, and this might 
become a part of the secretariat's continuing work in this area.
STRATEGIC CONSIDERATIONS FOR CARIBBEAN COUNTRIES
Caribbean countries seem to favour preservation and 
improvement of CBI-type arrangements, i.e. preservation of non­
reciprocal duty-free access to the United States, and improvement 
in the sense of obtaining duty-free status for those products 
currently exempted under the CBI. This status would provide the 
Caribbean with reassurance against an important concern of 
Caribbean countries, i.e. their fear of inability to compete with 
Mexico, particularly in those commodities which are currently 
exempted from the CBI. It would also eliminate the prospect of 
having to grant reciprocal duty-free treatment to the United 
States, Canada, Mexico and Europe. This status would not eliminate 
the need to compete with Mexico in the United States market, but at 
least the degree of access for those products which were previously 
exempted from the CBI would have improved. The joint United 
States/CARICOM Council provides the CARICOM countries with a forum 
for making representation to the United States Administration on 
these issues. Consideration may need to be given to possibilities 
of coordinating the positions of the CARICOM and non-CARICOM 
Caribbean countries on this matter, if this is thought to be 
desirable and feasible.
Is this position attainable? Or why would the United States 
agree to preserving and improving the CBI in favour of the 
Caribbean countries? Three considerations come to mind. First, as 
was referred to above, the CBI has been of immense benefit to the 
United States economy, in terms of jobs and income. Secondly, it 
has also been of immense benefit to a number of Caribbean and 
Central American States, in terms of incomes, jobs and presumably 
social and political stability. Thirdly, there is the "small 
country argument", which might convince in favour of exemptions or 
special treatment.
The counter argument may be, first, that from the point of 
view of benefits to the United States economy, even greater 
benefits are expected out of NAFTA and EAI, since improved access 
would be provided for United States products. Secondly, a CBI- 
arrangement is simply not compatible with trends in the global 
economy, and with NAFTA and EAI, a large part of the motivation for 
which derives from these same global trends. Thirdly, there may be
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the perception that preferences given to the Caribbean have served 
to postpone rather than facilitate adjustment.
Even if this position were not attainable, the process of 
seeking it might allow the Caribbean valuable time to minimize the 
possible adverse consequences of inevitable adjustment. Adjustment 
to a different trading relationship with the United States; and 
possibly with Europe. More fundamentally, it might allow valuable 
time for the Caribbean to continue the process of putting its house 
in order and put in place the more liberalized trade and economic 
policies which are the essence of the current orthodoxy. It may 
provide time to assess its competitive position with Mexico in 
certain identified areas, and to adopt measures for dealing with 
it. It might provide valuable time also to seek to operationalize 
the investment and debt relief aspects of the EAI, again on the 
assumption that Caribbean countries will have satisfied the 
eligibility criteria for benefiting under the EAI16. Yet there is 
also the danger of losing policy focus and diluting the will to 
adjust in the pursuit of a position which may not be achievable.
It has been clear for some time that Caribbean countries 
needed tò put economic adjustment measures in place, in order to 
bring these economies into line with evident global economic 
trends, and to provide a basis for their effective participation in 
the world economy. Buttressed, however, by preferential trading 
arrangements with Europe under the Lomé Convention, with Great 
Britain in respect of bananas, and with the United States and 
Canada under CBI and CARIBCAN; and conscious of the possible social 
consequences of adjustment, Caribbean countries have found it 
possible to continue to postpone adjustment, and to enjoy standards 
of living which are high by comparison with most developing 
countries. While it behooves policy makers and negotiators to 
attempt every possible means of alleviating social consequences of 
adjustment, there is no question that such adjustment is a current 
imperative. Since, as it happens, many of the NAFTA
conditionalities coincide with the very adjustment imperatives of 
Caribbean countries, it may be difficult to adopt a non-NAFTA 
stance if it appears that NAFTA will come into being. The greater 
the extent of trade liberalization, the greater the opportunity for 
achieving industrial efficiency, the lesser the fear of trade 
reciprocity, and the closer the Caribbean gets to satisfying 
eligibility criteria for participation in NAFTA. The very recent 
modifications to the CARICOM CET are a step in the right direction. 
It would-be desirable, however, if adoption of specific adjustment 
measures were informed by a careful examination of the likely 
economic and social impact of these measures on particular sectors 
and industries.
16 The change in the United States Administration may 
further delay the ratification and operationalizing of the NAFTA.
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NAFTA . ; may also present the Caribbean with certain 
opportunities. In particular, if the Caribbean does in time accede 
to NAFTA, it will be provided with an immensely enlarged market for 
its goods and services, and with considerably enlarged economies of 
scale for the production of certain goods for which, presumably, 
there would be a window of opportunity for Caribbean exporters. 
There would appear to be possibilities for the forging of business 
partnerships, for production sharing or contract manufacturing, 
involving the Mexican private sector; even possibly joint tourism 
promotion., It would be in the Caribbean's interest to make every 
effort to fully explore these possibilities and to seek to take 
every advantage of the vast opportunity which a NAFTA could 
provide. Much of the responsibility for these efforts would rest 
with the private sectors of Caribbean countries, which would have 
to proactively seek out and take advantage of all opportunities; 
and with the governments whose macroeconomic policies and business 
incentives must be focused on export development.
Strategically, it may suit the Caribbean's cause well if 
rather than continuing to seek preferences or concessions (which in 
many instances it fails to take advantage of), and appearing to be 
going against the tide of global and hemispheric liberalization, it 
presented a solid case for development support which was set 
explicitly within the framework of economic adjustment. Such 
support might consist of a package of financial and technical 
cooperation measures geared specifically to assisting industries 
with identified export potential, in market research and market 
penetration in the context of NAFTA, increasing industrial and 
economic efficiency, and dealing with some of the social costs of 
adjustment in the interest of hemispheric social and political 
stability. There may be a convincing case for the kind of three- 
pronged approach of the EAI, providing for increased investment and 
trade, supported by significant debt relief.
ROLE OF THE CDCC IN THE CONTEXT OF NAFTA
The CDCC has at least two important attributes. First, as an 
organ of the United Nations it has the potential for accessing the 
considerable resources of the United Nations system, and bringing 
them to bear on particular issue areas which may be of importance 
to the member States of the CDCC. Secondly, because of its 
geographical and numerical composition, it is the most pan- 
Caribbean of Caribbean organizations, and therefore uniquely 
qualified to serve as a forum for purposes of consultation on, and 
possible coordination of effort, where required, in regard to a 
range of issues. Inevitably, however, joint activity of certain 
types may be limited by the mainly consultative nature of the CDCC, 
which is not vested with the same kind of "political" or executive 
authority which characterizes certain other Caribbean regional
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organizations. The CDCC is essentially "... a coordinating body for 
whatever activities relating to development and cooperation may be 
agreed upon and to serve as an advisory and consultative body to 
the Executive Secretary of ECLAC in respect of Caribbean issues and 
circumstances". While the work of the Office tends to be 
circumscribed by limited resources and by its operational scope, 
this function may allow an even greater degree of consultation and 
coordination among the member countries than exists at present.
Issues such as NAFTA and the EAI are of interest to all of the 
members of the CDCC, and of very pressing concern to the majority 
of members, anglophone and non-anglophone. The CDCC may be the 
only institutionalised forum within which the members, 
participating as equals regardless of constitutional status, can 
exchange information on their interests in, and perspectives on, 
NAFTA and the EAI. It is the only organized forum within which the 
CARICOM members can be sensitized to the concerns of the non- 
CARICOM members on this matter; and where the non-CARICOM members 
can be made aware of the manner in which CARICOM has been dealing 
with the issue. The CDCC may be well positioned as a forum for 
obtaining agreement on a coordinated position on NAFTA at a pan- 
Caribbean level; for agreeing on a coordinated approach to some of 
the technical work to be done in regard to this issue; or for 
discussing and possibly coordinating aspects of the negotiating 
strategy.
In the case of NAFTA and the EAI, there is a clear dimension 
which relates to Latin American-Caribbean cooperation. Whatever 
possibilities there may be for seeking to relate with Latin 
America, as a whole, for purposes of the EAI or with Mexico for 
purposes of the NAFTA, may perhaps be usefully explored with the 
involvement of ECLAC/CDCC, given its innate Latin American 
connection. Inspite of the limitations alluded to above, the CDCC 
has the potential to play an important contributory role in dealing 
with issues which have a clear Latin American dimension. A number 
of member countries of the CDCC have already begun to increase 
bilateral economic cooperation with countries of Latin America. The 
Caribbean's concern with NAFTA and the EAI may possibly contribute 
to an even greater awareness of the need to devote attention to the 
fostering of a deeper economic cooperation relationship between the 
countries of the two subregions.
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The North American Free Trade Agreement among the United 
States, Canada and Mexico reflects a desire for hemispheric trade 
and economic consolidation on the part of the members, in the face 
of changing global economic realities. It seeks to create a wider, 
more assured market for the products of the members, and to provide 
for a closer integration of their trade and investment relations.
The member countries of the CDCC, most of which are 
beneficiary countries under the CBI, are concerned that the margins 
of preferential access to the United States market which they enjoy 
under the CBI, may be reduced or lost. This concern is fed also by 
recognition of Mexico's "natural" advantage vis-à-vis the United 
States market. -Garments, sugar, citrus and rum (and possibly 
tourism) are among the sectors which are particularly important to 
the Caribbean, and where existing competitive advantages may be 
eroded.
The Caribbean has a number of possible options. It might do 
nothing, and hope that time and other circumstances would determine 
the fate of NAFTA or otherwise result in the preservation of the 
status quo. This would be unfortunate in that it would serve to 
postpone inevitable economic adjustment. The NAFTA
"conditionalities" coincide with the requisites of economic 
adjustment in many Caribbean countries; and with evolving global 
orthodoxy. So that the Caribbean may be ultimately constrained to 
seek membership in NAFTA, if it appears likely that the agreement 
will be operationalized. The adjustment processes in the Caribbean 
may need to be buttressed by development support packages from the 
internátional community, which will both prepare the countries for 
participating in, and benefiting from, an increasingly competitive 
world, and assist them to deal with some of the social and 
political fall-out of such adjustment.
The Caribbean's accession to NAFTA may challenge the 
countries' private and public sectors to take advantage of new 
opportunities which the expanded North American market may provide.
The CDCC may be a useful forum for consultation on issues such 
as the EAI and NAFTA, and for an exchange of perspectives from both 
the anglophone and non-anglophone Caribbean.
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